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COMMENT
A Sceptic Looks Again at “Housing
Theory”
PETER SOMERVILLE
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK
I am grateful for being given this opportunity to comment on the Focus articles by
David Clapham (This issue) and Hannu Ruonavaara (This issue). Since the two
papers are very different, I will comment on them separately.
David Clapham’s Paper
Kemeny (1992) complained that housing studies at the time was narrowly consti-
tuted, largely focused on empirical research, and failed to make use of social theory
from outside its ﬁeld. The distinction he was making was between research that
merely describes or re-describes housing phenomena and research that offers new
explanations and new understandings of those phenomena. Clapham, however,
argues that this distinction is “ﬂawed”. By adopting a very wide deﬁnition of theory
as “collections of concepts about the real world that facilitate explaining, predicting,
or intervening”, he includes in it all forms of re-description that can be regarded as
“theoretically engaged”. He then distinguishes “between research that makes theory
by breaking new ground in theoretical and conceptual development and research that
only seeks to apply theory without developing it”. This distinction, however, is
effectively the same as Kemeny’s, so long as the “theory” that is applied here is what
is assumed by empirical researchers. So this is a sleight of hand whereby theory is
redeﬁned to make it seem like something new is being said. For Clapham, the
descriptive housing researchers that Kemeny was criticizing are theoretically
engaged (if only implicitly), but they are not doing theoretical work as understood
by Kemeny (or Ruonavaara). Thus, the distinction between theory and re-description
seems to disappear in Clapham’s account. Obviously, if we deﬁne theory to be what-
ever we want it to mean, it is easy to argue that all research has a theoretical
foundation.
Clapham does not explicitly say what he means by housing theory or theory of
housing. Adapting his wide deﬁnition, however, we could say it is “collections of
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concepts about the world of housing that facilitate explaining, predicting, or inter-
vening”. Clapham has his own housing theory in this sense: he sees housing as “a
complex and unique commodity” and “a basic foundation for life”, which both seem
rather obvious, and he points out the limitations of neo-classical economic theory for
explaining these characteristics of housing, which are also well known. He suggests
that there are different theories of housing in different disciplines but, with the possi-
ble exception of neo-classical economics, it is not clear what these different theories
are. He sees a single uniﬁed theory of housing as “extremely desirable” but does not
explain what form this might take or why it would be desirable at all. It might be
more illuminating to question what might be meant by the world of housing. Is it,
for example, the world of practice – the world of housing professionals and practi-
tioners? Is it the world of housing markets (conceptualized as a ﬁeld by Bourdieu
2005)? Or is it perhaps not a world in itself but an integral part of a wider world of
ﬁnancialized capitalism?
Much of Clapham’s paper is about housing policy, but I think his discussion
would be regarded by Kemeny as somewhat atheoretical. Basically, it describes the
types of mechanisms or interventions used by government: regulation, direct provi-
sion, subsidy, information/guidance, accountability mechanisms, issue deﬁning and
non-intervention; and approaches to the policy process: analytical/rational/positivist,
political/pluralist and structural. All of these are well known, and Clapham’s attempt
to apply the three approaches to housing policy does not seem to add anything to
our understanding. In any case, much of what passes for housing policy in England
today is driven by ideology and prejudice and does not clearly follow any of these
approaches (Somerville 2016a).
Overall, therefore, little of what Clapham says is new, and where he does have
something new to say, namely about the meaning of theory, his argument tends to
obscure important distinctions.
Hannu Ruonavaara’s Paper
This paper addresses the question of what kind of theory housing theory can be.
Initially, it deﬁnes a theory as a “hypothetical construction based on a mixture of the
researcher’s imagination, concepts and ideas drawn from previous research and
empirical knowledge” (179). This seems to me a more sensible deﬁnition than
Clapham’s, and not unlike Popper’s (1963) concept of a conjecture. Later, however,
the paper deﬁnes “social theory” as “a discourse that consists of a set of linked (a)
concepts and (b) propositions to be used for hypothetical (i) re-description, (ii) expla-
nation and (iii) interpretation of all or some subset of social entities, relations and
processes” (181). This is quite a demanding deﬁnition. While accepting, contra
Clapham, that theory must involve more than re-description, it might be questioned
whether a social theory must also provide both explanation (e.g. causal or functional
or ﬁt to a model) and interpretation (new meanings and understandings).
It is pleasing to note that Ruonavaara agrees with my earlier argument (Somerville
2005) that a general theory of housing is impossible (Clapham seems to agree as
well, though he qualiﬁes it to the present time), whether this be a theory that “en-
compasses all housing-related topics” (180) (version 1) or a theory about “the invari-
able relationship between features of housing systems … and features of society”
(183) (version 2). It is true that Ruonavaara’s arguments are rather different from my
own. For example, he asserts that housing is a “non-topic” because “there are many
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theoretical objects linked with housing, and theorizing them is more or less con-
nected with theoretical debates elsewhere” (187). I ﬁnd myself in agreement with
this argument, however, and, contrary to what Ruonavaara alleges, I have never said
that theorizing about housing was not possible at all – witness my own work with
Bo Bengtsson on middle-range theory (Bengtsson and Somerville 2002) or my men-
tion of relationships between housing and non-housing features in particular coun-
tries that can be theorized (Somerville 2005) or my more recent theoretical work on
homelessness (Somerville 2013).
Beyond this, however, I would want now to argue that, although general housing
theories are not possible, more general social theories are – and indeed already exist.
For example, Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieusian theories, to which Ruonavaara
refers, actually theorize different objects: Marx theorized capitalist social formations
in terms of capital-labour relations, Weber theorized bourgeois society in terms of
markets, social status and political action, and Bourdieu theorized modern society in
terms of sets of positions and dispositions ordered by different types and volumes of
capital. Social stratiﬁcation, therefore, means different things in the different theories.
A general social theory constructs its own object and housing is just one part of the
general picture.
Apart from theory of housing, Ruonavaara identiﬁes theory about housing and
theory from housing. I’m not sure, however, how theory about housing differs from
theory of housing. Any theory that attempts to explain housing phenomena sounds
like a theory of housing. The crucial difference seems to be that theory about hous-
ing rejects the housing universalism of theory of housing version 1 and, in the per-
son of Kemeny (1981), posits a neo-Weberian typology of social structures as either
privatized (corresponding to home ownership) or collectivized (corresponding to
cost-renting). This dichotomy seems simplistic – for example, it does not include pri-
vate renting. This is perhaps why, as Ruonavaara notes, it has been widely ignored
by commentators. As for theory of housing version 2, Ruonavaara recognizes that
this is the same as Kemeny’s general theory about housing, which, as Ruonavaara
acknowledges, I criticized in my earlier work (Somerville 2005) – a criticism that he
seems to accept. So, I’m not clear what, if anything, is left to be said about theory
about housing other than that it is speciﬁc (rather than general) theorizing about
housing phenomena, such as my own work mentioned above.
Theory from housing is rather different. Ruonavaara cites King (2009) to show
that the social embeddedness of housing is not an insurmountable barrier to its
theorization. On one level, this seems a truism, since anything in the world can be
theorized in some way. On another level, however, it suggests that it may be possible
to theorize housing as part of a wider system of social relations; that is, as part of a
theory of the “social” – a position that Ruonavaara (and King) seem to reject. For
King, however, theorizing (from housing) is not about this but about the experiences
and activities of people using housing, and Ruonavaara does not tell us what this
theorizing amounts to. Ruonavaara also cites Clapham (2009), who adopts a more
cautious and pragmatic approach to theorizing from people’s experience of housing
– an approach that seems close to my own sceptical but open-minded approach to
theorizing housing. But I see no reason to call this “theory from housing”.
Overall, therefore, there are many interesting points and arguments in
Ruonavaara’s paper, but I am not entirely convinced of the utility of his typology of
housing theories as theories of, about or from housing. I think there is an important
distinction to be made between, on the one hand, grand theories of housing, which
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posit highly generalized relationships between aspects of housing and aspects of
wider society, and, on the other hand, more speciﬁc or middle-range theories of
housing, which attempt to throw light on historically and geographically speciﬁc
housing processes and systems. It is also possible to make a general distinction
between theories that attempt to explain correlations between variables and those that
attempt to make sense of people’s experiences. And beyond these there exist social
theories that try to explain the ways in which housing is embedded in capitalist soci-
ety and so-called welfare states. “Housing theory” is, therefore, highly diverse, and I
remain sceptical about the more generalized, “grand” approaches within housing
studies. However, if I understand Kemeny correctly, I agree with his aim to formu-
late more general social theory, which can then help to explain housing processes.
My point is just that general social theory already exists, which could more fruitfully
be applied to housing, or within which housing could usefully be situated. I have
tried to do this, in a very limited way, in my own work (Somerville 2016b; ch. 8;
see also Aalbers and Christophers 2014, who situate housing within political
economy).
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